Swindon GWR was then, with Metropolitan Vickers, the best engineer training school in Britain. The 54 hour week was austere and strict as the apprentices moved through every stage: 'nut scragging' and lathe work (beginning at 6 a.m. in the freezing 1917-18 winter), the millwright and engine erecting and repair shops, the tool room, the gas engine power house, the plant repairs gang; the GWR network's hydraulic power system; then, after 41/2 years, on to the Test House and the Drawing Office. Christopher always remembered the craftsmen who trained him; a fitter's tribute 'you're the best craft apprentice I have ever had' remained a lifelong source of pride. He appreciated the problems of working-class life: earning 25 shillings a week of which £1 went on lodgings at a fitter's home; the boredom of weary repetitive work, especially if it was to be lifelong; the appalling number of accidents.
In 1919 in a railway strike he and other premium apprentices volunteered for footplate work and were ostracized, with the danger that the Company might be forced to end their apprenticeships. This memory remained vivid in his old age, along with the certainty that his judgement had been faulty. (During the 1926 General Strike, however, he was to work as a trainee fireman in South Wales.)
He spent his apprenticeship evenings at the Technical College; doing five hours study a day before and after the 54 (later 47) hour week in the shops. He won the Great Western Chairman's Prize for the best apprentice of the year, and in 1923 the W.H. Allen scholarship awarded by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers for three years at Trinity College, Cambridge. (He had to leam Latin to pass the entrance examination.) At first he felt a fish out of water, the more so as he took the Tripos in two, not three, years. But he won a Trinity Senior Exhibition and made good friendships, nurtured on 25-35 mile walks. Above all, the Cambridge Engineering School was outstandingly good, with teachers such as Charles Inglis, David Pye and William Farren. Inglis's method of teaching engineering theory as a branch of applied mathematics altered Christopher's whole outlook and gave him a fundamental approach, invaluable in later years. He also taught by example the art of lecturing. Christopher was one of only nine people to get a First Class in the Mechanical Sciences Tripos and in his third year he did research, for which he shared the John Wimbolt Prize.
He won the Second Yeats Prize and a Trinity Senior Scholarship in the Spring of 1926, but left Cambridge that summer to join Brunner Mond in Northwich, Cheshire. Job hunting was not easy: the GWR told Inglis 'Hinton would have been a good engineer if he had stayed with us, but now that he has been up to Cambridge we would not dream of taking him back'. This was the attitude of most engineering firms to university training in those days.
T h e c h e m i c a l i n d u s t r y : B r u n n e r m o n d a n d IC I
Brunner Mond aimed to take the cream of Oxford and Cambridge chemists and, later, the engineers. This produced a generation of outstanding men which makes Hinton's promotion to Deputy Chief Engineer at the incredibly early age of 27 the more remarkable; he was probably younger than any of the men for whom he was responsible. By that time the firm had become one part -the Alkali Group -of the merger company Imperial Chemical Industries. But Hinton found Northwich socially snobbish: the managerial and scientific staff considered themselves to be in a different class from the design engineers and formed a separate social group hanging onto the fringe of County society. He felt in retrospect that it was partly in reaction that he fell in love with Lillian, a local girl who was head of the tracing office, whose education had stopped with elementary school and whose father was a turbine driver in the works.
They married in Chester Cathedral in 1931. They met many of the expected snobbery problems but Christopher felt that, in the 30 years before they left Cheshire, Lillian had become one of the best-loved and most respected women in the district. Their one child, Susan (who married engineer Arthur Mole), was bom in 1932. Christopher's mother, suffering from cancer, lived with them for several months until his father retired. After she died in 1933 his father remarried, living for another 18 years.
Brunner Mond, based on the Cheshire salt fields with Buxton limestone and cheap coal nearby, was then one of the three biggest chemical manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom; its main products were soda ash, caustic soda and sodium bicarbonate. It prospered but Hinton felt that its engineering and half its Board of Directors were fossilized. By the standards of the time its factory management was good and its small research department under Dr Freeth outstanding; it had, for example, invented polythene. Freeth with his scientific and technical foresight also taught the chemical industry how to use pure, fundamental science to evolve and optimize manufacturing methods. One of Hinton's first jobs was to plan the new large research laboratories, which were far ahead of their time. He damaged his ankle while jumping over an excavation for this project; neglected, the injury was to become a serious disadvantage because it impaired his balance. After the laboratories he took charge of the recently formed instrument department, so crucial at a time of rapid technological change.
On becoming Deputy Chief Engineer of the Alkali Group, Hinton studied it for six months, doing every job from shovelling lime and limestone to working in control laboratories. ICI's biggest challenge was to emulate the German chemical industry, in particular by designing, constructing and operating a synthetic ammonia plant at Billingham. Hinton was deeply involved in all the crucial practical problems and also in important deductive theoretical reasoning about the brine fields. Inter alia he suggested offshore drilling for salt, which, he was told, was quite impracticable; these deposits under the sea were, however, developed.
At 29 Hinton became Chief Engineer of the Group, responsible not only for the design office but also for the programming, inspection and construction departments. Construction staff were regarded as managerial but all the other engineers as second-grade citizens of a different social class from that of the works managers and research scientists. Many had started as apprentices in the works, some had been recruited from outside and very few had university degrees. They did all their own design work and most of the design engineers were generalists, doing their own civil, structural and plant design. Practices were extremely conservative and much of the design work was clumsy and extravagant. Hinton's conception of the role of an engineering department was quite different and he achieved for it the same status as management and research and also equality in organizing and determining the course of development.
In the slump of 1930 Hinton was told to sack half his staff and embark on no work showing a gross return on capital less than 33.3% per year. It was a heartbreaking job for a young man but he realized that without the slump he could not have made his engineering department into a highly efficient organization. After the slump most of the new staff were young graduate engineers. He created profitable employment in two main new fields: mechanical handling and fuel economy. He put on to mechanical handling W.L. (later Sir Leonard) Owen, a former Liverpool University graduate, who now modernized and mechanized the packing and handling of soda ash and caustic soda in a highly profitable way, introduced bulk transport of ash to major users and -a job with especially far-reaching results -introduced the transport of lump limestone between Buxton and Northwich in a fast shuttle service of 40 ton vacuum-braked wagons (this in the face of intense opposition from the LMS Railway).
The transport scheme was so successful that it was to be the prototype for the 'merry-go-round' trains adopted much later by the Central Electricity Generating Board under Hinton's chairmanship for their coal traffic to the large new power stations. The fuel economy scheme involved raising steam pressure from 225 to 900 pounds per square inch. This and 900 degrees Fahrenheit represented steam conditions then used in only a few power plants and involved building new boilers and power plants: the whole process was one of the most complex and one of the biggest financial risks Hinton ever took. The gamble succeeded. Indeed, he often reflected that the art of gambling plays a big part in engineering and that young engineers should be taught to play poker or bridge as part of their training. 'All pioneering in engineering is very much like poker; there are some things that you know for certain, some things that you think you know and most importantly some things that you don't know and know that you can't know. With this sort of information you have to decide what risks it is worth while to take. You know too that you cannot win every hand but that you have to play each hand so that you end up as an overall winner at the end of the game'. He used to play poker quite often until after World War II but lost interest in it when he worked on atomic energy 'because I was gambling all day and every day in the plant designs that we were doing. I was gambling for stakes of millions of pounds and the last thing I wanted to do was to go on with the same game for ten shilling stakes in the evenings'.
Among the other ICI plants that he recalled with pride was the first all-welded tall steel building in Britain: the bicarbonate of soda building. He had realized that Britain lagged far behind Europe in welding and had sent one of his staff -a Cambridge-trained, German-speaking engineer -on a course in Germany. This made the Alkali Group a leader in British welding practice. As the slump ended extensions could be made to other process plants and there was interesting civil engineering work, for example in reorganizing the brine fields: sinking a greater footage of boreholes than anywhere else in Britain, laying cross-country pipelines and redesigning the waste lime beds. Hinton found standardizing both general and engineering stores for the whole of ICI one of the most interesting jobs of all; in one group there were, before standardization, 892 different sizes and types of bolt, of which 58% were eliminated. This resulted in stores of guaranteed quality and surprising reductions in both price and administrative costs. The job was an exercise in both persuasion and engineering judgement.
By 1935 the Alkali Group Engineering Department was extremely efficient and economical. Careful estimates were compared with measurements mid analysis of the work done and bar charts compared programmes and progress for each job. For overall management Hinton prepared a long-term programme of jobs related to costs, dates and staffing. He could reflect that in his ICI years his Department had (among other things) designed the world's first small polythene plant to the Research Department's specification. In 1928 the Works Management team had dominated the Group but by 1935 the Engineering Department was at least an equal, if not the senior, partner. Nevertheless, although it was usual for Chief Engineers to be made Delegate-Directors on the Group Board, nine years passed before this happened to Hinton. He reflected that he had increased the authority of the Engineering Department too much to be popular outside it.
W ORLD W A R II
From 1937 ICI was involved in rearmament. The Alkali Group was to build a plant for extracting bromine (a reagent) from sea water as well as manufacturing the anti-knock compound tetraethyl lead for the RAF. The United States provided the flowsheet and design information but Hinton learned about the sophisticated construction materials and how to handle highly toxic chemicals. The plant proved a small masterpiece of design, programming and construction. Hinton learned above all in this period the difficult and rare skill of site selection: although he consulted senior colleagues he chose all the sites for 'his' factories and himself did the layout on a drawing board in his office.
After France fell in 1940 he was appointed Assistant Director of Ordnance Factory Construction to speed the building of two new cordite factories. He took with him eight of his Northwich engineers including Leonard Owen, Harold Disney and Charles Turner, who were later to transfer with him to the atomic energy project. Their task was to identify causes of construction delays, progress late plant deliveries and prepare programmes to accelerate the production start-up date by six months. The grossly overloaded Ministry of Works was responsible for buying plant and for constmction. By Hinton's standards near-chaos ruled. His own system of programming, purchasing and progress chasing, and his close personal involvement at every stage, brought order; a third factory, ordered in November 1940, broke all records for design and constmction of a cordite factory. Hinton reflected that, after the sophisticated control at Northwich, the experience was like being cast to do major engineering works on a desert island. He also learned that 'outsiders' like him and his team were in those early days of the war resented and treated badly not by the most senior, but by the middle grade, civil servants.
In February 1941 with three of the same close colleagues he moved to the Explosive Filling Factories organization, where in 1943 he was to become (belatedly) the Deputy Director General. It was huge, employing at peak 150 000 workers. There were eight new factories and two old ones, some employing 30 000 workers on three shifts. Nine smaller ones were also planned. His conclusion after a first factory tour and his introduction to the London headquarters, where he was to work, had been that he had never seen anything so 'deplorably incompetent'. At the planning end he believed that capacity was grossly overdesigned, because additional plant could not be effective until the need for it had passed.
At the production end he believed that such confusion reigned in the production planning and the factories that an ammunition shortage scandal loomed, similar to that of World War I. Very few of the operations were technically complex but the filling factories -the last operation in a long production chain -were at the mercy of their customers and many suppliers. The main need in running them was flexibility to ensure that, whatever the changes in demand, every component of both the production line and the weapon came together in the right place at the right time.
He held personal responsibility not only in the main programming, engineering, production and process mechanization activities but also in most of the main areas of administration: in particular organizational structure but also labour availability, staff recruitment, gradings, time study and payments systems. He admired his statistical colleagues, in particular Lord Layton, their director, who insisted on a six-week stock of empties between the engineering and the filling factories in order to maintain regular production; this was a courageous decision when the armed forces were short of explosive stores. The Director-General once told Hinton that the organization found him 'too forceful' in pressing his position if he felt he was right, but Hinton knew this was necessary to get anything done. Most of the executive management of the huge enterprise was gradually left to him. He wrote by hand detailed notes, charts and schedules showing the organization and staff of the Filling Factories and describing their functions and responsibilities. By 1943 they were able to deal extremely smoothly with rapidly changing demands, even when their Westminster headquarters were badly damaged by flying bombs. There were only two serious factory accidents in this huge organization.
All this time Hinton had very happily shared a Westminster flat with his longstanding Northwich colleagues, Leonard Owen and Harold Disney, paying fortnightly visits to his Cheshire home and regular visits to most of the factories with all the discomfort of wartime travel. Early in 1944 his blood pressure collapsed through overwork. When the rocket attacks on London began, most of the staff from headquarters, including his flatmates, were evacuated and Hinton always remembered his acute loneliness. Unable to afford the flat on his own he slept in the depressing bomb shelters at Shell Mex House. He had many anxieties and always remembered with horror one night in February 1945 when, after working late, he felt like a trapped animal in his basement bedroom. He rang the Chief Medical Officer who came and soothed him. That memory haunted him for 20 years so that he found every possible excuse for avoiding travelling alone: he must know that there was someone at hand to talk to if need arose. Lillian came down to stay with him in London for a time.
As early as August 1944 Hinton discussed the problem of running down the Filling Factories when the war neared its end and in September produced a detailed report for the future of each factory for releasing staff, breaking down surplus stores, and disposing of plant. These procedures worked extraordinarily smoothly: 50 000 workers left in the six months after V-E day and all but the three permanent factories had been decontaminated and handed over for other use. There had been no labour disputes and no hitches. Long afterwards Hinton felt this was an unnoticed and unsung triumph of organization, and also that these years had been the hardest in his life. Douglas (Lord) Jay, an economist and wartime civil servant, has recently told the author that he admired Hinton more than any other wartime colleague, with one possible exception.
T h e a t o m i c e n e r g y p r o j e c t
Hinton suspected as early as 1941 that ICI did not want him back. From 1944 they made various unsatisfactory, even wounding, proposals. In mid-November 1945 Sir Wallace Akers, an ICI director, who had been in charge of Tube Alloys -the wartime British atomic energy organization -invited him to take charge of the industrial organization to be created within the Ministry of Supply to produce fissile material. Hinton accepted, provided first that he was given full responsibility for the design, construction and operation of the factories and secondly that, if industrial applications for atomic energy proved practicable, he would be responsible for them. He did not -unfortunately, he wrote later -get these conditions confirmed in writing. His salary as Assistant Controller of Atomic Energy would be £2500 per year (plus payments to the ICI pension fund), an unwelcome drop from his wartime post (albeit more than the salaries of his colleagues John Cockcroft and William Penney). Owen, Disney and Turner and half a dozen other ICI staff agreed to go with him.
Hinton had been told that the atomic anergy establishments would be munitions factories for making fissile material for bombs. For this and other reasons, including proximity both to the homes of all four engineers and to the ICI research laboratories at Widnes, some empty offices at the Risley Filling Factory near Warrington were chosen as headquarters. Work began there in February 1946 with a total staff of 18, including typists and messengers.
The background to the British atomic project was as follows. The discovery of uranium fission had been openly published in 1939 but an atomic bomb had at first seemed impossible. It was work in Britain, culminating in the Maud Report of 1941, that had first shown how and why a bomb was possible certainly with 235U and possibly with the new element plutonium. The plutonium work derived from that of two French scientists who had fled to England from Joliot Curie's Paris laboratory with the total world stock of heavy water as France fell. The Maud Report was given to the United States and led them to set up the Manhattan Project. After a difficult period when Britain was excluded from it, a small team of her scientists (including refugees) participated in American work on 235U and bomb fabrication but they were not associated with the final designs and construction of diffusion plants. Nor were they admitted to the plutonium producing reactors. However, Canada provided facilities to pursue reactor design under John Cockcroft's direction.
Given her crucial wartime role, Britain was determined to have her own atomic project immediately the war ended. It was a great blow when, in 1946, the U.S. Congress passed the McMahon Act, which prevented any Anglo-American exchange of information on plant processes or designs, even for peaceful nuclear power, until the mid-1950s, and on nuclear weapons until 1958. Meanwhile it had been axiomatic to Mr Attlee, the new Prime Minister, that Britain must immediately launch her own project. It was to be located in the Ministry of Supply under Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Portal as Controller. Besides Hinton's production group there was to be a research establishment at Harwell under Cockcroft. The specific decision to make a bomb was not taken until January 1947 and thereafter William Penney was to become responsible for bomb design, testing and fabrication. The central structure of the organization was weak and success depended on the leadership of Hinton, Penney and Cockcroft and their ability to collaborate with each other.
Nearly a decade later, in 1954, the Atomic Energy Authority with Edwin Plowden as chairman was to be created to take over responsibility from the Civil Service. Hinton then became Board Member for Engineering and Production, in what he called 'a troika' with Cockcroft and Penney. By 1953-54 the project was excellently served by other government departments and Hinton reluctantly accepted the reorganization, which increased, rather than eased, the workload.
The early days had indeed been heroic for Hinton and his teams. His task in 1945 was to design, build and operate, with the greatest possible urgency, plants (of very different types) to purify uranium metal and make fuel elements, to enrich uranium, and to produce plutonium. For plutonium alone, nuclear reactors and plants for separation, purification and fabrication were required. Apart from their inherent complexities, the size of each plant had to be decided in relation to the others, when it was not even clear whether enough uranium would be available. Site selection to meet exceptionally demanding criteria was very difficult in Britain; the three sites chosen were (in pre-motorway days) widely scattered in northwest England. There was an acute shortage of skilled staff. Yet, to take one example, the very difficult gaseous diffusion plant was completed within a week of the date planned three years earlier and at a cost £%M less than the financial sanction of £14M.
Hinton took a key role in all the crucial decisions. He recalled, for example, deciding on the type and number of filter presses -there was a large building full of them -for the manufacture of pure uranium oxide from ore, on the basis of samples of sludge half an inch deep in the bottom of a two-ounce bottle. He saw advantages as well as risks in the need to dispense with pilot plants: without them, the designer had to think for himself. An especially great difficulty was the absence of any experience in Britain of designing large-scale industrial plants for processing radioactive materials. He was proud that there had been not a single case of radiation sickness or uranium poisoning at the fuel element factory when he left the Authority in 1957.
In that year, one of the Windscale reactors caught fire; 'those monuments to our initial ignorance', as Hinton called them, had, however, produced the plutonium required for the first phase of the military programme and fulfilled other essential roles. The other plants operated exceptionally well in doing what was asked of them: the first billets of plutonium were delivered in time for Britain's first bomb test at Montebello off the North West Australian coast in October 1952. Few people outside the Industrial Group appreciated the size and complexity of their efforts, problems and achievements. Hinton himself had been deeply involved in every part of this first industrial phase of the atomic project. He had drawn up the master programmes, chosen the sites, planned the general layout for all the factories on a drawing board in his office, decided the contingency allowances and capital cost estimates. Until 1954 he visited every construction site once a month and chaired most of the design and progress meetings. He had been personally concerned in the conceptual design of all the plants and with most of the vital detailed design. One of Hinton's chief engineers at Risley has written:
It is all too easy to dism iss the success then achieved as being due to there being at that time a brilliant engineer in charge at R isley who was able to work with a degree o f autocracy which would be im possible today. W hile there is truth in that, it is also true that Hinton was a great project manager, and young engineers today can learn a great deal from how he got such good results from teams o f engineers and scientists drawn from so many different backgrounds o f experience and training.* C a l d e r H a l l a n d n u c l e a r p o w e r p r o g r a m m e s Hinton regretted the public linkage of his name with the success of Calder Hall -the first nuclear plant in the world to feed electricity into a grid -for he was personally less intimately concerned with its design and construction than with that of the other atomic plants of his R isley years; he gave the credit to his colleagues. The idea of a gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactor to be used in conjunction with a steam boiler to generate electric power had been evolved by three Risley engineers in 1947 as a way of meeting plutonium demands but had been rejected for reasons of time. The feasibility study for such a plant by the Parsons-Reyrolle subsidiary, Parolle, was pigeon-holed because of uncertainty over the fuel elements. Subsequently, after important early work at Harwell, Hinton's Springfields Laboratory developed a magnesium alloy fuel can (Harwell named it Magnox) that made possible higher top temperatures in the heat cycle. Hinton now proposed that new, urgent military demands for plutonium should be met by building this PIPPA (pile for producing plutonium and power) reactor: among other considerations, selling the power produced would make the plutonium much cheaper than that from the Windscale reactors.
The day after the first PIPPA was sanctioned in February 1953 work began on the master chart for construction. Hinton's organization was in charge of building and operating the four PIPPA reactors at Calder Hall and, later, four carbon copy reactors at Chapelcross; they used but directed the consulting engineers Merz & McLellan. The operation went well-nigh faultlessly and owed much to Owen. The first Calder reactor was handed over within a week of the programmed date and was on power and feeding electricity into the grid within three months. There was immense excitement, and also admiration abroad (especially in the United States) when the Queen opened it in October 1956. Over 30 years later, the Calder-Chapelcross 'family' of reactors -too often overlooked by those disillusioned with nuclear power stations -are still operating smoothly and efficiently. Hinton was to write, late in life, 'when we started in 1946 the Americans had a lead of four years on us and those were years in which they had an overriding priority and first call on the services and resources of [a long list] of the great American Corporations. We started four wartime years behind them; after only ten years we had a lead of at least two years. It took only another seven years to throw that lead away'.
Early in 1952 a group of Hinton's staff had begun to draw up a long-term atomic power programme. The first attempt by three of his engineers (J.M. Kay, G.R.H. Geoghegan and D.R. Poulter) was modest, moving forward in logical and tried steps. In February 1955, following the report of an interdepartmental committee under Burke Trend of the Treasury in which Risley views were represented, a much more ambitious ten-year programme* was published: 1500-2000 MW of nuclear power by 1965. It involved twelve power stations: eight gas-cooled, with three different steps in design, and the last four possibly liquid-cooled. An appreciable credit was to be given for the by-product plutonium, which could be used later as fuel in reactors of advanced design. This assumption put the cost of nuclear power at about 0.6p per unit compared with the Kay-Geoghegan-Poulter figure of 1 .Op. The value of plutonium would fall rapidly but would, it was calculated, be offset by improvements in later reactors. (Plutonium did in fact keep its value for about ten years.)
The initial smaller programme for development of nuclear power proposed by Risley could conceivably have been handled by their organization, although they were very heavily loaded with defence work. The Trend Report required that full responsibility be transferred to industry, to heavy electrical firms and the boilermakers. But the latter were still in Hinton's words 'sophisticated blacksmiths' and -although the former all had research departments, good manufacturing capacity and some well-trained engineers -only C.A. Parsons had already given high-quality support to Risley. Hinton recommended that each of the four major heavy electrical firms should associate with a boilermaker and send a team to Risley for training: this they did late in 1954. The idea of nuclear consortia -each made up of heavy electrical, boiler, civil and general engineering firms -was to come later, in 1957, from Claude Gibb of Parsons; Hinton then supported it. However, nuclear power soon threatened to become a bandwagon with firms scrambling for a place; the negotiations between all the parties concerned were endlessly complicated and the outcome (with some exceptions) unhappy. There were also demarcation problems between the Atomic Energy Authority and the Central Electricity Authority (forerunner of the CEGB), whose reputation for design and construction was then poor. Risley -and Hinton -were reluctant to release control because they knew they had succeeded only through grinding, unceasing care.
The Trend Report, albeit less sensible than the Kay-Geoghegan-Poulter proposal, still seemed reasonable to Hinton. Suffering from severe exhaustion, he had been ordered to rest for six months in 1956, when, however, he made a triumphant visit to Japan; this led to an order for a nuclear power station which was, alas, sadly mismanaged by the consortium involved. The British Embassy said that no previous visit of an individual had so greatly enhanced British prestige except possibly that of the Prince of Wales in the late 1920s. (Hinton was to make several later visits and he received the Order of the Rising Sun.) During that time the discovery of large reserves of uranium in Canada, lowered forecasts of coal output and threats to oil supplies from closure of the Suez Canal, had led to proposals for a greatly enlarged -indeed trebled -nuclear programme: 5000-6000 MW of nuclear power by 1965.** However, the plutonium credit had by now been reduced to a low figure representing a surplus, rather than the shortage, of plutonium envisaged earlier.
In this period a nuclear power station was taken to have a capacity of 150-200 MW. A modest national programme of 2000 MW would therefore require about a dozen stations and a second round of orders would double the number. The concept of four consortia, each getting an order in the first round and on the second round moving near to a common design, made sense. Nobody argued the possibility that the competition between coal and oil would cause a great increase in the capacity of all power stations. Orders would be far fewer but technical difficulties would increase. Capacities did increase and each consortium went ahead with its own design. There were not enough orders to give more than a modicum of replication.
Hinton increasingly disagreed with developments of policy and procedure arising from what he called 'stampeding into a wildly expanded programme'. As early as July 1956 he had written a long letter to Sir Harold Hartley questioning whether the Atomic Energy Authority could continue in its present form for more than three or four years as responsibility for design of industrial reactors was, rightly, handed over to big electrical firms while the electricity authorities did not wish the AEA to stand between them and their suppliers. 'The Atomic Energy Authority will be caught between two fires and in 4-5 years will be in an untenable position... It will become an Atomic Energy National Physical Laboratory with the additional responsibility for running the diffusion plant, the uranium plant and the chemical separation plant. ' Meanwhile he opposed Plowden's proposals for an Authority organization that would have divorced Board Membership from management of the Groups. (Sadly, the proposals for reorganization and Owen's advocacy of the increased nuclear programme led to a breach in the long friendship between Hinton and Owen, healed only just before Owen died years later.) Hinton was offered a lucrative post in private industry. But he preferred to remain a public servant and on Plowden's recommendation was appointed early in 1957 the first chairman of the newly formed Central Electricity Generating Board. Two months after he left the Authority, disaster struck Windscale in the form of a fire in one of the original Windscale reactors. Late in life he reflected that the incident sounded 'the death knell of that tiny, gallant, closely knit band of men who had built up the Industrial Group and who by 1956 had given Britain a world lead in atomic energy. But perhaps I am wrong. Perhaps it was not this at all. Perhaps the truth is that, when any technological development becomes a totem of national prestige, common sense flies out of the window.' He thought the report of the Penney Inquiry on the fire well balanced but was outraged by a later White Paper's emphasis on faults of judgement by the operating staff. He himself saw the causes as the absence of fundamental research on graphite, and staff shortages due to the salary structure which had always made recruitment of factory staff so difficult.
The record of Hinton's atomic energy years would be incomplete without a reference to his enthusiasm -even greater than Cockcroft's -for pressing ahead with the fast breeder reactor without which, it seemed, known reserves of uranium would not long support a nuclear power programme. Despite the great pressure of the military programme a Harwell-Risley Design Committee had been founded in 1951 and Hinton was to take great pride in the reactor at Dounreay, believing in his last years that it was only in this field that Britain could still claim to have a clear lead in nuclear power technology.
THE CENTRAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING BO ARD
The 1957 Act created not only the CEGB, which was responsible for generation, grid transmission and wholesaling of electricity, but also twelve Area Boards for distribution and retailing and an Electricity Council where the chairmen of the Central and Area Boards met: a forum for collective thought and advice to Ministers on electricity (including its pricing). Hinton worked very well with the two Chairmen of the Council in his period: Henry Self (a former civil servant) and Ronald Edwards (an academic economist).
The CEGB carried a huge responsibility: 262 conventional power stations, 6000 route miles of grid, assets valued at £1000M and 53 000 employees. Yet Hinton was to call this period of his life 'The sad failure'. He and his wife hated London when they moved there in September 1957 and he found the atmosphere of the CEGB far less stimulating than that in his previous jobs, which had had an epic quality and where even the frustrations had often been challenging. Now bound to work through full-time board members and to devolve operational responsibility to five regional organizations, he was inevitably isolated from the practical work he loved, even though he knew that this most capital-intensive of industries could not be successful unless its engineering was good.
He believed that when he went to the CEGB its generator design and construction departments were poor and that he failed to make them satisfactory. This became more serious when in 1962 greatly increased forecasts of demand gave construction programmes that would have taxed the resources of a far stronger organization. Hinton felt sure that they would lead to over-provision of plant, with serious financial and industrial consequences, and also serious overload on the engineering department, with failure to meet target commissioning dates. Nevertheless the programmes remained unchanged.
As for execution of the programmes, Hinton sent small parties to study methods in the United States and Japan, where construction was far speedier, but the resulting promises of shorter construction periods were never fulfilled. He subsequently reflected ' the engineering department never really believed that it could match the performance that was normal in the U.S.A. and Japan -our engineers thought that they were beaten even before they started and no engineer can meet a tight construction schedule unless he believes in it and is determined to meet it'. Standardization of sets was belatedly introduced but the set chosen caused great problems and 'deplorably low availability'. Delegation to power plant consultants produced no better results. Hinton's insistence on replication for the expanded programmes was ignored.
Everything was more difficult because there were four manufacturers of turbo alternators and four boiler makers, all with their own designs (fewer than before but to be compared with two in the U.S.A.). Hinton's attempts to rationalize were only partly successful and indeed it was pointed out that he had originally supported the existence of several independent groups. He found the engineering department unreceptive to guidance and longed to be in direct control of design and construction. On one occasion, at Fawley, he was able to avert catastrophe with the foundations.
During his CEGB period some people wrongly suggested that Hinton had turned against nuclear power. He certainly questioned the size of the nuclear power programme, the type of reactors and the choice of consortia to build them. On size he succeeded at last, in 1960, in reducing the programme to the figure he had recommended in 1956. As for reactor systems, he himself had visited North America and was impressed by the Canadian heavy water and the United States light water reactors. In a famous Axel Johnson lecture in March 1957 he had advocated British concentration on gas-cooled reactors but had envisaged that licences might be negotiated with Canada and the United States if at any stage water reactors seemed a better proposition. When in 1964 the CEGB invited tenders for the first of a new more powerful generation of reactors -Dungeness B -they could embody light water, as well as gas-cooled, types. The economics set forth in the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) proposal were superior to those for light water reactors. However, information about the new reactor types and the relative strengths of the competing firms was inadequate and, after Hinton had retired, the contract was placed with a firm to whom he had denied -amid much bitter and public criticism -a contract for an earlier station. The various traumas of this period suggested to some that Hinton had turned against nuclear power. But he insisted on flexibility and on basing atomic, like other, judgements on engineering and economic considerations, rather than on prestige. Despite his fierce reputation his weakness at the CEGB was insufficient, rather than excessive, ruthlessness.
When Hinton left the CEGB in 1964 he felt that he had failed as chairman because he had not been able to build the strong engineering department essential to the Board's success. The weakness led not only to late commissioning and low availability of plant; if, he said, we had learned to build power stations as quickly as Japan and the United States, the gross overestimation of demand, which harmed the electricity supply industry and the manufacturers, would have been avoided. He felt he could not assume, as he had done in ICI, the filling factories and atomic energy, that when decisions were made and directives given they would be followed. The engineers, he wrote, 'would not leam -as the engineers at Risley had learned -that they were not paid to be clever, they were paid to be successful'. He had found it difficult to carry out reforms in a large organization where the staff were firmly set in their ways. Although the staff in crucial branches, including transmission and the small research laboratories, were good, he thought those in the large and important generation design and operations branches were largely, though not uniformly, pedestrian. He had aimed to improve recruitment, training and promotion. The one aspect of station construction for which he had unqualified praise was the labour relations machinery, and the Union leadership. But he was proud of the standards that were achieved in practically every area of the Board's performance, apart from the construction of generating stations: outstanding research, visual amenity, labour relations, capital budgeting.
He played an important personal role in all of them; receiving, for example, a Royal Society of Arts medal for his work on visual amenity where he was in advance of his time in promoting understanding between industrialists and conservationists. Though constantly criticized on this issue, he reflected that as chairman he had spent more time on it than on any other single subject. He examined every proposed main transmission line route and visited every proposed power station or main switching station site and collaborated closely with Lord Holford. During his chairmanship the Board built up, most successfully, its research (albeit with a different organization from that which he had advocated). In retirement he was, till his death, deputy chairman of the industry's research council, often visiting the laboratories, always learning, always teaching. Deep affection grew between him and the staffs.
O v e r s e a s r e l a t i o n s
Hinton was a superb ambassador for Britain with his impressive stature and eager face; his courtesy and quick perception of place, people and problems; his exceptional lucidity in explanation; and his unfeigned enthusiasm. He showed not only intense interest in his hosts' countries, problems and plans but also a relaxed warmth in professional and social gatherings which an innate reserve and intense nervous energy sometimes concealed at home. The great success of his visits to Japan has already been mentioned. Wider success in international relations was especially marked and admired in his years of office in the World Energy (previously Power) Conference, which brings together those concerned at a high level with the development and use of all sources of energy. In 1962, when the chairmanship of both the International Executive Council and the British National Committee fell vacant, he was chosen for both offices -despite his chairmanship of the CEGB -because of his interest in all sources of energy and his personal distinction. For many years he represented the Royal Society on the British National Committee of the Conference.
This work brought out his greatest qualities. Some people in Britain who had found him 'difficult' would have been surprised by the great praise for his patience and understanding in presiding over meetings of representatives from such a large number of countries and in achieving consensual, positive decisions. They would not have been surprised by his clarity of thought and exposition, even as Chairman of a multilingual assembly, nor by his ability to distil succinct conclusions from long discussions. There was immense respect in the Conference for his own professional achievements, his thorough preparation and his ability to grasp the problems of, and establish warm relations with, representatives from so many countries, including those from Eastern Europe. He played a crucial part, up to the year of his death, in ensuring the preparation of outstanding papers. He presided at meetings of the International Executive Council at Stockholm in 1963 , Lausanne in 1964 , Haifa in 1965 , Tokyo in 1966 , Accra in 1967 and Moscow in 1968 His connection with the WEC ended with his chairmanship in 1968. But in 1975, when the Conference established a Conservation Commission for a global study of long term problems of energy demand and supply, Hinton was invited to be Special Adviser.
His World Energy Conference work had made Hinton especially anxious to help with the problems of developing countries and in retirement he became part-time Special Adviser to the Public Utilities Section of the Projects Department of the World Bank: work which, he said, gave him more undiluted enjoyment than anything else he did. He examined, in connection with loan applications, the electricity supply industries of Turkey, Brazil and Taiwan. He persuaded Taiwan, for example, to delay the construction of a proposed nuclear power plant and mapped out for them, to their enduring gratitude, an excellent hydro system.
In 1968 he proposed and negotiated an East African scheme which integrated the hydro resources of Uganda with the needs of energy-deficient Kenya and which survived later political tension; electricity could still flow between countries at war with one another. He felt that his last report for the Bank -on the Water and Power Authority of West Pakistan (which he had wanted to visit ever since reading Kipling's Kim) -was his best. But, politically unpopular, it was not implemented. His great caution on nuclear power plants in developing countries was so unpalatable that his report on the subject was not printed. Later, as President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, he visited West African Commonwealth countries. The travels of these years exacted physical costs. A virus infection from the Middle East permanently impaired his vocal cords. Later, the travel on the 'washboard' roads of Pakistan caused spinal injury which, incorrectly treated, led to increasing lameness, lack of balance and permanent pain. His wife's illness ruled out further expeditions.
Later, for six years in the 1970s, he was involved in European affairs through spending three days a week on House of Lords subcommittees scrutinizing draft EEC directives from Brussels on transport, research, energy and the environment.
R e t i r e m e n t
When Hinton left the CEGB no firm offered him an executive or advisory position. Two offices gave him especial pleasure and commitment in retirement. He became Deputy Chairman of the Electricity Supply Research Council, who provided the office, secretary and car service that made possible the activity and comradeship of his last years. This was especially important as his wife died very suddenly in 1973 and for ten years he lived alone at their Dulwich home. The great affection of the staff of the research establishments was symbolized on what was to be his last birthday, when they produced a cake with 82 candles, which he blew out himself. This led to a happy discussion of the relation of candle diameter and spacing to a possible chain reaction.
The other position dear to him was the Chancellorship of the University of Bath, from its creation in 1966 out of the Bristol College of Science and Technology until 1980 when he resigned because of his physical difficulties. He served tirelessly and devotedly and was also for some years the very active Chairman of Council. Happy continuity came from the appointment as Vice-Chancellor of Leonard Rotherham, who had been with Hinton, in charge of research, at both the Industrial Group of the Atomic Energy Authority and the CEGB. Hinton's annual reflective and beautifully composed speeches at Congregation -a refreshing combination of inspiration and common sense -merited publication by the University. He delighted moreover in the city, its history and literature, knowing, for example, every house and street where Jane Austen and her heroes and heroines lived or stayed.
Otherwise his self-label for his retirement was 'The Odd Job Man'. These extra commitments can be partly measured by numbers: between 1970 and 1980 he wrote or gave over 200 lectures, articles and speeches. He was also active in the House of Lords. In 1965 the Prime Minister had asked him to investigate the coordination of all forms of transport. He was given no help and did the job alone feeling, he wrote, more isolated, helpless and miserable than at any other time in his life. He divided the task into intercity and urban transport and met the four month target completion date. He was then asked to do a much more detailed study of 'smalls and sundries', this time with Civil Service help. All this took seven months in which he could only 'broad-brush' the problems.
Otherwise his advice was rarely sought. The only Whitehall request came in 1974 from Lord Rothschild of the Central Policy Review Section in the Cabinet Office asking him to investigate problems in the Dounreay prototype fast reactor. Hinton reported no fears for the reactor itself but had misgivings about the steam raising units, doubts that proved well founded when serious faults appeared soon after the reactor went into operation. Helped again by Dr Rotherham, Hinton examined the problem and suggested alterations in design.
PERSONALITY AND PROFESSION
Hinton towered over his profession physically and also intellectually and professionally. His mind was logical and deeply probing and his education and career had combined craftsmanship with research, design, planning and operations management in all the main sections of the profession -mechanical, chemical, electrical and constructional -and at all stages from site selection to process detail. He was widely and deeply experienced in management structure, procedures and control. He had worked in both private and public organizations but even when, as in his wartime work and in atomic energy, money was a secondary consideration, cost control was to him a crucial part of management. It was said that he looked after the taxpayer's money as if it was his own and throughout his career he emphasized that it was more important to be successful than to be clever. He had an aesthetic instinct for simple and elegant solutions in seeking the plant, process and organization that produced the required result at minimum cost. He spoke and wrote eloquently. Albeit highly strung and sometimes emotional, he took decisions coolly and at moments of crisis was 'unflappable'. He was often called authoritarian but in formulating policy was the reverse. Before taking decisions he wanted to argue them out: no holds were barred in debates with his staff but once decisions were taken it was necessary to stick to them. Proud, uncompromising in his standards, incapable of dissimulation, sometimes hard to bear, he threw himself unreservedly into every task he undertook.
Hinton was entirely uninterested in popularity or the possible cost in career terms of pressing his views. In his friendships he showed, despite eloquence and warmth, a personal reserve, even severity (and occasionally short-lived self-pity), which impeded the closer bonds he may have wanted. Cosy relations with his own staff, industrial firms or Whitehall were foreign to his nature. He loved to visit factories and drawing offices and to talk to young people; junior staff could be amazed to find their radical suggestions listened to and even adopted. But he could be mercilessly and unnecessarily critical, inspiring awe in most and real fright in some, albeit mainly among those unable or understandably afraid to stand their ground with him. Some called him 'Sir Christ'. Yet he would accept reproof from those who dared offer it and kindness lay beneath the formidable exterior. His personal staff were invariably deeply devoted and he was approachable, the reverse of ruthless, to those who served his projects well.
His personality and professional life were inextricable. He read widely and he had the long expressive hands and temperament more often associated with artists, although at the worst moments of crisis with factories or plant his calmness was exemplary. He does not appear to have studied pictures or sculpture but he was, like his father, expert in architecture and history; he could date the features of any church he entered within a decade. His concern for the environment and his innate 'feel' for landscape had their origin in his delight in walking the countryside. Indeed, his engineering brilliance derived from his deep understanding that in his profession technology, science and art mingled together, and from his rare capacity to blend them. When in 1975 he added a frontispiece to an unpublished memoir he ended with a quotation from Kipling's 'Conundrum of the workshops'.
Each man hears as the twilight nears to the beat o f his dying heart The D evil drum on the darkened pane 'you did it, but was it Art?
Within his profession he was a Fellow of the Institutions of Mechanical, Electrical, Chemical and Civil Engineers but his first and greatest loyalty was to the Mechanicals, of which he became a Graduate in 1921. He was a member of Council from 1935 to the mid-1950s and President in 1966-67. It is fitting that the Hinton conference room at the Institution, looking over St James' Park, contains a portrait, a bust and his Orders and that his personal papers -a large collection, including his unpublished memoirs -are in their library.
In his later years he filled three other especially important posts of honour (and hard work) in his profession. In the 1970s he greatly enjoyed his chairmanship of the Committee that chooses the winner of the Mac Robert Award for the innovation in the physical sciences and technology that has made the greatest contribution to Britain's prestige and prosperity. It made few mistakes and picked out enduring winners. Meanwhile in 1976 he succeeded Prince Philip as President of the ten-year-old co-ordinating body, the Council of Engineering Institutions. Changes in the Charter and Statutes had just been made, which also created a Fellowship of Engineering giving the profession an elite body to do for engineering what the Royal Society did for sciences and scientific technology: in particular to raise the standards and status of the profession. Because the President of the CEI was also to be President-Chairman of the Fellowship, Hinton also assumed that post, without, at first, financial or secretarial support. He guided and developed the Fellowship of Engineering in its first five years until he retired as its president in 1981. His enthusiasm and energy were crucial to its success.
Hinton's 82nd birthday, recalled above, showed that admiration within the profession was now combined with deep affection. Far from diminishing, his reputation grew. He bestrode the British engineering profession of his day like a colossus and in 1976 became only the fourth engineer-industrialist to receive the Order of Merit since its foundation in 1902. Despite pain and lameness he remained extremely active and his mind was undimmed until the fall (soon after his 82nd birthday) which led to his death. Westminster Abbey was full for his memorial service. Just as he did not divide knowledge into compartments, he did not divide time into tenses. He was passionately interested in the past, the present and, even at 82, in the future. His words to students at Bath had enshrined his optimism and creative courage: 'you are going out into a changing world ... but all change is a challenge. I am not offering you any pity. What I wish is that I was young enough to share the challenge with you.'
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